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WEMYSS v. SUPERIOR COURT
[S. F. No. 18508.

In Bank.

[38 C.2d

Mar. 19, 1952.]

EDWIN D. WEMYSS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT
OF COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 439, Real Party in
Interest.
[1] Mandamus-To Courts-Depositions.-There is no appeal from
an order refusing to quash a subpoena requiring a witness to
testify by deposition, and mandamus is the proper remedy.
[2] Statutes- Construction- Giving Effect to Statute.- Where
possible, all parts of a statute should be construed together
and construed to achieve harmony between seemingly conflicting provisions rather than holding that there is an ,irreconcilable inconsistency. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)
[3] Depositions-Securing Attendance.-Although the first subdivision of Code Civ. Proc., § 1986, seems to conflict with the
third subdivision as to whether a subpoena requiring attendance on the taking of a deposition may be issued by the clerk
of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending or
by the clerk of the superior court of the county wherein the
attendance is required, both subdivisions may be given effect
by construing subdivision one to authorize the clerk of the
court in the county where the action is pending to issue the
subpoena in cases where the witness resides in that county or
within 100 miles of the court, the reach of the subpoena, and
his attendance is required within the county or the 100-mile
radius; in cases where the witness resides beyond the reach
of the subpoena of that court it is issued by the clerk of the
court of the county in which the attendance is required, with
the limitation that the witness resides in that county or within
100 miles of that court.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Alameda County to quash a subpoena. Writ granted.
Lafayette J. Smallpage, Carl M. Gould and Harold J. Willis
for Petitioner.
James F. Galliano and C. Paul Paduck for Real Party in
Interest.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, §§ 134, 170; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 363.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, §54; [2] Statutes,
§ 164(1); [3] Depositions, § 17.
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CARTBR, J.-An action was commenced in the Superior
Court in San Joaquin County by plaintiff against several
labor organizations for injunctive and damage relief for
picketing by defendants. On the application of one of the
defendants, the clerk of the Superior Court of Alameda
County issued a subpoena requiring plaintiff, petitioner here,
to attend before a notary public in Oakland, Alameda County,
to testify by deposition and to produce certain documents.
Plaintiff made a motion in the Alameda County Superior
Court to quash the subpoena on the ground that the clerk
of that court had no authority to issue it, as plaintiff resides
in San Joaquin County and the action is pending in the
court there. Plaintiff resides within 100 miles of Oakland
where the subpoena required attendance. The court granted
the motion insofar as the subpoena required the production
of documents, but denied it with respect to its order that
he appear to testify. Petitioner, by this proceeding in mandamus, seeks to have the court of Alameda County ordered to
quash the subpoena in all respects on the same ground advanced in his motion.
[1] There is no appeal from the order of denial and
mandamus is the proper remedy. (See Brown v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal.2d 559 [212 P.2d 878] ; Strauss v. Superior
C01trt, 36 Cal.2d 396 [224 P.2d 726] ; Carnation Co. v. Superior
Cm~rt, 96 CaLApp.2d 138 [214 P.2d 552] .)
'fhe question presented requires an interpretation of section 1986 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:
'' 1. A subpoena is issued as follows : To require attendance
before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or upon the
taking of a deposition in an action or proceeding pending
therein, it is issued by the clerk of the court in which the
action or proceeding is pending, under the seal of the court,
or if there is no clerk or seal then by a judge or justice of
such court;
"2. To require attendance before a commissioner appointed
to take testimony by a court of a foreign country, of the
United States, or of any other state in the United States, or
before any officer or officers empowered by the laws o£ the
United States to take testimony, it may be issued by the clerk
of the superior court of the county in which the witness is
to be examined, under the seal of such court ;
'' 3. To require attendance out of court, in cases not provided
for in subdivision one, before a judge, justice, or other officer
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authorized to administer oaths or take testimony in any matter
under the laws of this state, it is issueCJ. by the judge, justice,
or other officer before whom the attendance is required.
''If the subpoena is issued to require attendance before
a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, it is issued by the
clerk, as of course, upon the application of the party desiring
it. If it is issued to require attendance before a commissioner
or other officer upon the taking of a deposition, it must be
issued by the clerk of the superior court of the' county wherein
the attendance is req1tired upon the application of the party
desiring it upon proper showing by affidavit to be filed with
said clerk." (Italics added.)
Petitioner contends that under the facts presented the
only court which may issue the subpoena for a deposition is
the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, relying
upon the italicized portion of the first subdivision. Defendants
rely upon the italicized portion of the last paragraph in the
third subdivision, urging that the clerk of the court in the
county in which the attendance for the deposition is required
must issue the subpoena.
In 1872, when the Code of Civil Procedure was adopted,
the first subdivision made no mention of taking a deposition
and the process was issued under the seal of the court before
which the attendance was required or in which the issue was
pending. Subdivision three read substantially the same as
the present second subdivision, except that it required that
the subpoena be issued by the judge. Subdivision two was
substantially like the first paragraph of the present third subdivision, except that no mention was made of excepting cases
not provided for in subdivision one. In 1907 (Stats. 1907,
p. 730) the section was amended, stating subdivisions one and
two and the first paragraph of subdivision three in the same
language as is now used. The last paragraph of subdivision
three was different in that the last sentence required an order
of the court or judge for the issuance of the subpoena. The
code commissioner's note on the 1907 amendment recited:
''By this amendment and the amendments to § 1991, it is
intended to change the rule as to the issuance of subpoenas
so as to provide that a subpoena to give testimony by deposition must in all cases be issued by the court in which the
deposition is to be used, and to provide an adequate process
for the punishment of contempts committed in disobedience
to a subpoena.'' Section 1986 was last amended in 1929
(Stats. 1929, p. 197) to read as it does now, that is, to authorize

Mar.1952)

WEMYss

v.

SuPERIOR CoURT

619

[38 C.2d 616; 241 P.2d 525]

the clerk to issue the subpoena without court order, thus
changing the last sentence in the second paragraph of subdivision three.
It might appear from a cursory reading of section
1986 that the first italicized portion conflicts with the last
italicized part, because in the first it says the clerk of the
court in the county where the action is pending issues the
process, and in the latter, the clerk of the county where the
attendance is required. The commissioner's note on the 1907
amendment seems to indicate that only the clerk of the former
court was to have the issuing power.
Factually the same question was before this court in 1925,
where we construed the statute as it existed after the 1907
amendment. (Pollak v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 389 [240
P. 1006].) As we have seen the later amendment in 1929
did nothing more than eliminate the necessity of a court order
before the clerk could issue the process as provided in subdivision three. Hence, the statute was the same as it now is
for our purposes. In the Pollak case the action was pending in
a justice's court of the City and County of San Francisco.
Pursuant to section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure
plaintiff in the action gave notice that defendants' deposition
would be taken before a notary in Napa in Napa County.
Defendants resided in San Francisco County, but less than
50 miles from Napa. At that time section 1989 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provided that a witness was not obliged
to attend as a witness before any court or officer outside the
county where he resided, unless the distance was less than 50
miles. Since then the distance has been increased to 100 miles
(Stats. 1935, p. 942). Plaintiff, under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1986(3), obtained an order from the Napa
County Superior Court to the clerk of that court for the
issuance of a subpoena for attendance at the taking of the
deposition in Napa. Subpoenas were accordingly issued and
defendants, petitioners in this court in the case, sought to have
them set aside by the Napa County Superior Court. Relief
was denied and they petitioned for certiorari to annul the
order of denial in this court. The petition was denied despite
petitioners' claim that the Napa County court had no jurisdiction to order the subpoenas, because the action was pending in San Francisco where they resided. The court said :
''That portion of subdivision 3 of said section 1986 which
forms the basis for the granting of the order herein complained of declares that a subpoena issued in accordance there-
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with requiring the attendance of a witness before an officer
upon the taking of a deposition 'must be issued by the clerk of
the superior court of the county wherein the attendance is
required upon the order of such court or of a judge thereof,
which order may be issued ex parte.' In the case of Scott v.
Shields, 8 Cal.App. 12 [96 P. 385], in dealing with an apparent
conflict which arose between certain provisions of said section
1986, as a result of an amendment added thereto in 1907 (Stats.
1907, p. 730), it was held to be proper for a judge of a superior
court, upon the request of a plaintiff in an action pending in
another county, to grant an order directing the clerk to issue
a subpoena requiring a witness to attend before a notary
public for the taking of the deposition of said witness to be
used in said action, and that if the witness refused to answer,
it was mandatory upon said judge, under whose direction the
subpoena issued, to compel said witness to answer and to
complete his deposition.
''The only limitation placed upon the territorial force and
effect of a subpoena issued out of a court of record is found
in section 1989 of said code, which reads as follows : 'A witness
is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge,
justice, or any other officer, out of the county in which he
resides, unless the distance be less thmi fifty miles from his
place of residence to the place of trial,' and in the case of
Met·rill v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 55 [164 P. 340], it was
expressly held that a subpoena issued by the clerk of the
superior court, pursuant to the provisions of said subdivision
3 of said section 1986, as amended in 1907, had the same
territorial force and effect as a subpoena issued by the clerk
requiring the attendance before the court, and 'may require
the attendance of a witness even though he resides outside the
county but within the fifty-mile limit.'
'' . . . it is apparent, in view of the law as interpreted in
the two cases above cited, that the judge of the Superior Court
of Napa County was authorized by said subdivision 3 of
section 1986 of said code to grant the order for said subpoena,
and that the subpoena issued pursuant to said order carried
sufficient territorial force and effect to require the attendance
of petitioners as witnesses outside the county in which they
resided, the distance being less than fifty miles from the place
of their respective residences to the place where they were
required to attend.'' (Pollak v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 389,
391 [240 P. 1006] .)
Petitioner argues, however, that the court in the Pollak
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case was concerned with the limit of the jurisdiction of a court
to serve a subpoena, rather than the problem of which cou,rt
had power to issue the process; that in cases where the witnesses' residence is within the range (100 miles) of the subpoena power of the court in the county where the action is
pending that court has the issuance power under subdivision
one, and the provision in subdivision three comes into play
only when the residence of the witness is outside that range;
that such construction recognizes the sound policy of having,
whenever possible, the court where the action is pending, and
which will try the case, as the one to determine what questions are proper, etc., in event of a refusal to answer questions.
We agree that the primary question involved in the Pollak
case was the permissive territorial range of a subpoena. While
factually a situation similar to that in the instant case was
presented, the court made no reference to the specific question here involved, namely, the apparent conflict between
subdivisions one and three of section 1986. In Scott v. Shields,
8 Cal.App. 12 [96 P. 385), referred to in the Pollak case,
the question was whether the notary, before whom the deposition was to be taken, or the clerk of the court was authorized
to issue a subpoena (8 Cal.App. 12, 14), and there was no
discussion of the above mentioned conflict in section 1986.
Merrill v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 55 [164 P. 340], referred to in the Pollak case, is subject to the same comment.
There is nothing helpful in Burns v. Superior Co~trt, 140 Cal.
1 [73 P. 597]. The case must, therefore, be determined by
proper statutory construction.
[2] Where possible, all parts of a statute should be read
together and construed to achieve harmony between seemingly
conflicting provisions rather than holding that there is an
irreconcilable inconsistency. (Code Oiv. Proc., § 1858; Estate
of Stevens, 27 Cal.2d 108 [162 P.2d 918] ; County of Los
.,;lngeles v. Craig, 52 Oal.App.2d 450 [126 P.2d 448]; 23 Cal.
J ur. 792-793.) [3] If section 1986 is construed to mean
that, by reason of subdivision three, in all cases a subpoena for
a deposition is to be issued by the clerk of the court in the
county where attendance is required, then the italicized part
of subdivision one is rendered nugatory. Both subdivisions
may be given effect, however, by construing subdivision one
to authorize the clerk of the court in the county where the
action is pending to issue the subpoena for a deposition in
cases where the witness resides in that county or within 100
miles of the court, the reach of the subpoena, and his attend-
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ance is required within the county or the 100-mile radius.
In cases where the witness resides beyond the reach of the
subpoena of that court it is isslJ_ed by the clerk of the court
of the county in which his attendance is required, with the
limitation, of course, that the witness resides in that county
or within 100 miles of that court. There is other wording in
section 1986 which supports that interpretation. It will be
recalled that the first part of subdivif!lion three refers to requiring attendance in cases "not provided for in subdivision
one" which may mean in cases beyond the territorial reach
of the court in the county where the action is pending, as
provided by section 1989 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This construction also harmonizes with and makes effective
the latter section which reads: ''A witness is not obliged to
attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice, or any
other officer, out of the county in which he resides, unless the
distance be less than one hundred miles from his place of
residence to the place of trial." It is, at least partly, in accord
with the code commissioner's note, supra, in that in all cases
permitted by section 1989, the subpoena is issued by the clerk
of the court in the county in which the action is pending.
Moreover, there are valid reasons, as urged by petitioner,
and above mentioned, why the court where the action is
pending should in all cases possible issue the subpoena and
entertain the proceedings under section 1991 of the Code of
Civil Procedure when the witness disobeys the subpoena.
We hold, therefore, that the clerk of the Superior Court of
Alameda County had no jurisdiction to issue the subpoena
and that court, respondent here, should quash it.
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the Superior
Court of Alameda County had no jurisdiction to issue the
subpoena. However, in my opinion, there is no basis for
distinguishing Pollak v. Superior Cmrrt, 197 Cal. 389 [240
P. 1006], and it should be overruled.
In the Pollak case, the court failed to mention the conflict between subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 1986, Code
of Civil Procedure, and appears to have been misled by the
importance of the territorial issue. But the decisive question
was stated as follows: ''In the case at bar the witnesses whose
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testimony is sought to be taken in Napa County reside in
San Francisco, at the very place of trial, and are available
therein as witnesses at any time. In view of that situation
the question arises as to whether or not a party to an action
may, in any event, require the attendance of a witness outside
of the county in which he resides and wherein the action is
pending, for the purpose of giving a deposition, even though
the place where such witness is required to attend be less
than fifty miles from his place of residence.'' (Pp. 392-393.)
This is exactly the situation which is presented by the petition of \!If emyss.
Pollak was obliged to obey the subpoena issued by the
Superior Court of Napa County because, "in view of the
broad language of said section 2021 of said code, it would
seem that authority is granted to take depositions in any
county, irrespective of the place where the witness resides
or the place wherein the action is pending, provided only
the distance between the place of residence of said witness
and the place where his deposition shall be taken be less than
fifty miles." (Pp. 393-394.) This is directly contrary to
the determination of the same question in the present case.

[L.A. No. 19306.

In Bank.

Mar. 21, 1952.]

SOUTHWESTERN INVESTMENT CORPORATION (a
Corporation), Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Other than for the correction
of clerical errors, the recall of a remittitur may be ordered
on the ground of fraud, mistake or inadvertence; the recall
may not be granted to correct judicial error.
[2] !d.-Remittitur-Recall-Time of Application.-A motion to
recall a remittitur must be promptly made; while preparation
of voluminous notes and attempts to engage attorneys might
excuse a reasonable delay, unsuccessful attempts to invoke
other means of redress, such as persuading a city council to
act voluntarily in the matter in question, appealing to local
[1] See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error,§ 633; Am.Jur., Appeal and
Error, § 1263.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5, 7, 8] Appeal and Error, § 1773;
[2] Appeal and Error, § 1779; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1775.

